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THE DEVELOPMENT OF REASSIGNMENT
TO A VACANT POSITION IN THE
AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT

I.

IN-RODUMiON

In 1992, the employment provisions of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") came into effect. The main goal of the ADA is
to help bring the members of the disabled population in the United
States to join the workforce by eliminating discrimination in
employment.' One of the requirements of the ADA is that employers must make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity
can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity .*",2
Notably though, the ADA only protects against discrimination 3
for a "qualified individual with a disability,"4 which is defined as
"an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employ5
ment position that such an individual holds or desires."1
Before the creation of the ADA, there was some protection
against employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").6 Although it may be too early to
assess the effectiveness of the ADA, Congress had passed it
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. V 1994).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1994).
3. See 42 U.S.C. 12112(b) (Supp. V 1994); Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc.,

92 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 1996).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1994).
6. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1989 & Supp. V 1994).
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that was available until that
because of the inadequate protection
7
Act.
Rehabilitation
the
time under
One of the most significant differences between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, is that reassignment to a vacant position can
be one of the reasonable accommodations which an employer may
make to enable a disabled employee to perform the essential functions of a job.8
This Note will look at the prior view of reassignment under the
Rehabilitation Act, the current view of reassignment under the
ADA, and finally, problems that are still left unresolved.

II. THE

EMPLOYEE'S NEED FOR REASSIGNMENT

The change toward reassignment from the Rehabilitation Act to
the ADA seems to stem from an element of unfairness toward the
disabled employee. 9 Assume that Jack is a mechanic for an airline,
and is diagnosed with an ailment that prevents him from exerting
extensive, repetitive pressure on his wrists, causing him to no longer
be able to fulfill all of his functions as a mechanic. Under the Rehabilitation Act, if there are any reasonable accommodations which
the airline can take to allow Jack to remain in the position of a
mechanic, but not have to exert extensive, repetitive pressure on his
wrists, they must do so. But assuming that there is no reasonable
accommodation, under the Rehabilitation Act, the airline does not
have to transfer Jack to a similar or even a lower type of position,
such as an assistant, even if such a position is open and Jack is
qualified.
If Jack is a good worker, is it fair for him to be fired for his disability, especially when there are other jobs open which he is qualified to do and which will not adversely affect his disability? This
type of unfairness has spurred the change toward reassignment that
was included in the ADA.

7. See Pub. L. No. 101-336, §2, 104 Stat. 328, 328-29 (1990).

8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (Supp. V 1994).
9. The facts of the following hypothetical are based on those from Benson v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108 (8th Cir. 1995), where the court held that the employee made a
prima facie case that he was able to perform the essential functions of a mechanic's position,
so that the burden was shifted to the employer to prove that a reasonable accommodation
was not possible.
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Ill.

REASSIGNMENT UNDER THE REHABILITATION

ACT

The Rehabilitation Act of 197310 was enacted, among other reasons, to help disabled individuals attain meaningful employment,1 1
have a chance for independent living, 12 and to be integrated into
society through programs, projects, and a guarantee of equal
opportunity.' 3
A.

Statutory Language

The key wording of the Rehabilitation Act which deals with reassignment reads as follows: "No otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this
title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination...,,14 An individual with a disability includes "any
individual who has a physical or mental impairment which for such
individual constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to
employment.. ."15
When looking at section 504, which prohibits discrimination of
disabled individuals, the plain language does not clearly state that
reasonable accommodations need to be made to prevent discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual. To reach that
meaning, one needs to go to the interpretive guidance of the
Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS").' 6
B.

Interpretive Guidance for the Rehabilitation Act

The DHHS interprets the prohibition of discrimination in the
Rehabilitation Act to mean that "[n]o qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of the handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or otherwise be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity which receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance." 7 It then goes on to list sev10. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1989 & Supp. V 1994).
11. See id. § 701(b)(2).
12. See id.

13. See id. § 701(b)(1)(A), (E), (F).
14.
15.
16.
17.

29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1989 & Supp. V 1994).
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(A) (1989 & Supp. V 1994).
See 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1997).
Id. § 84.4(a).
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eral discriminatory actions which are prohibited.1 8 One only
reaches the requirement of reasonable accommodation when looking at the definition of a "qualified handicapped person," which, in
reference to employment settings, is defined as a handicapped person who can perform the essential'functions of the job, with some
reasonable accommodation.' 9
In later sections that pertain specifically to employment practices,
the DHHS reiterates that no qualified handicapped person shall be
discriminated against on the basis of that handicap, or in any activity to which this part of the DHHS applies.20 It then lists more
activities to which employment discrimination is prohibited.21
Finally, the DHIHS specifies the elusive doctrine of reasonable
accommodation. 22 It states that "[a] recipient shall make reasonable
accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the
recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of its program."' The reasonable accommodations that the DHHS lists are, by virtue of the language used, not exhaustive. 24 Rather, they simply include
restructuring facilities to make them more accessible and userfriendly to handicapped people,25 and restructuring the job, the
schedule, and the equipment, or providing readers or interpreters.26
In addition, the guidelines for interpreting whether an accommodation is an undue hardship are also listed. 7

The repetitiveness of the requirement of reasonable accommodation suggests its importance, but one must wonder why it was not
included in the language of the statute. Nevertheless, although
other similar accommodations were allowed,28 it seems as though
the legislature did not count on employers and courts to be so lit18. See id. § 84.4(b)(1)-(6).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See
See
See
See
Id.
See
See
See

id. § 84.3(k)(1).
id. § 84.11(a)(1).
id. § 84.11(b)(1)-(9).
45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1997).
id. § 84.12(b).
id. § 84.12(b)(1).
id.§ 84.12(b)(2).

27. See id. § 84.12(c)(1)-(3).

28. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b)(2).
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eral. As the following cases will show, reassignment was permitted
as a reasonable accommodation, but was never required.
C. Sample Cases of Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Rehabilitation Act
In Carter v. Tisch,2 9 the plaintiff was a custodian in a post office

who began to experience bouts of asthma, from which he suffered
since childhood, but was able to keep under control.30 The plaintiff
was assigned to temporary light duty, which included duties that
reduced the aggravation of his asthma.3 ' Several months later, the
plaintiff requested to be placed in a permanent light duty position,
but his request was denied.32 The reasons for the denial were that
there were no permanent light duty positions available in the plaintiff's type of employment, and that a collective bargaining agreement only allowed employees who have served five years to
become eligible for permanent light duty positions.33 The postal
service later terminated the plaintiff's employment, after determining that he could no longer perform the essential functions of his
job as a custodian.34
The plaintiff requested a hearing on the basis of handicap discrimination.3 5 The EEOC ultimately found no discrimination,36 so
the plaintiff sued in federal district court.37 The district court agreed
with the EEOC, and granted summary judgment against the plaintiff for the same reasons which the postal service initially fired
hin.38

On appeal, the plaintiff argued "that the postal service was
required to assign him to another position, that of a permanent light
duty laborer-custodian, as a 'reasonable accommodation' of his
handicap. ' 39 However, the court firmly restated the current law of
the time: that an employee is not required to assign a handicapped
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

822
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1987).
idat 466.
id
id.
id.
id.
822 F.2d at 466.
id.

37. See Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 466 (4th Cir. 1987).

38. See id at 466-67.
39. Id. at 467.
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employee to another job if he cannot do the job he is currently in.4"
The court then added that the refusal to reassign the plaintiff was
even stronger in this case because the employer was bound by a
collective bargaining agreement, and the plaintiff did not meet its
terms.4 1

As further support for its argument, the court relied on dicta
from a U.S. Supreme Court case 42 to determine that an employer
only has to reassign a disabled employee if the employer normally
does so under existing policies. 43 Therefore, since the post office
would not have normally assigned this light duty position to the
plaintiff because he served less than five years, there was no discrimination. 44 The court also relied on other various cases that reasserted the lack of an obligation to reassign a disabled employee
who cannot perform the essential functions of his current job, especially if it would adversely affect a collective bargaining agreement.45 Even if there were a duty to reassign, the plaintiff would
have to show that the collective bargaining agreement "had the
46
effect or intent of discrimination.1
The Cartercase dealt with a collective bargaining agreement that
would have prevented the plaintiff from being reassigned to a
vacant position. 47 However, the following case confirmed that the
law did not require reassignment under the Rehabilitation Act at
all.
In Guillot v. Garrett,48 the plaintiff was a civilian computer specialist employed by the Unites States Navy as part of the Naval
Intelligence Processing System Support Activity ("NIPSSA"),
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987).
43. See Carter,822 F.2d at 467.

44. See id. at 466-67.
45. See id.at 467-68 (citing Jasany v. U.S. Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir.
1985) (holding that an employer was not required to accommodate a handicapped employee
by restructuring a job in a way which would usurp the legitimate rights of other employees
under a collective bargaining agreement); Daubert v. U.S. Postal Serv., 733 F.2d 1367, 1370
(10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the Postal Service could rely on a collective bargaining
agreement to discharge an employee); Carty v. Carlin, 623 F. Supp. 1181, 1189 (D. Md. 1985)
(holding specifically that the Postal Service was not required to reassign a handicapped
employee to another position)).
46. Carter,822 F.2d at 469.
47. See text accompanying notes 42 to 46.
48. 970 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1992).
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which was a division of the Naval Intelligence Command
("NAVINTCOM"). 4 9 This division gathered, coordinated and inter-

preted naval defense intelligence information.50 The plaintiff was
required to submit Statements of Personal History, as part of a Special Background Investigation Periodic Reinvestigations, to enable
him to retain his clearance to access Sensitive Comparted Information ("SCI"). 51
During one of these periodic reviews, the plaintiff failed to disclose his then current addictions to alcohol and cocaine, in a Statement of Personal History and at two separate subsequent
interviews.5 2 Approximately two months after his interviews, the
plaintiff checked himself into a rehabilitation program, 3 and three
days later, NIPSSA revoked the plaintiff's SCI clearance.5 4 The
plaintiff appealed the decision a number of times to higher authorities, but was always denied due to his failure to disclose his dependencies." During one of the plaintiff's appeals, NIPSSA "adopted a
policy that all civilian Computer Specialists must have SCI clearance."56 After the several failed appeals, 7 plaintiff's employment
was terminated by the Navy for failing to have SCI clearance.58
That decision was upheld by the Merit Systems Protection Board
and the EEOC,59 and the plaintiff brought suit in the United States
District Court.6" The district court granted summary judgment for

the Navy, holding that it had no jurisdiction to review the Navy's
decision in this case, and that the Navy was not obligated to transfer
the plaintiff to another position "because he was not 'qualified' for
the position he held at the time of his termination...,,61
In reviewing the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling that the individual security classification decisions
were not subject to judicial review under section 501 of the Reha49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id. at 1321.
See id. at 1321-22.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Guillot,970 F.2d at 1321-22.
See id.
See id. at 1322.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1323.

60. See Guillot, 970 F.2d at 1323.

61. Id.
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bilitation Act.6' The court then examined the plaintiff's claim that

the Navy should have reassigned him to a different position. 63 The
plaintiff based his claim on a footnote from a U.S. Supreme Court
case,64 which stated in dictum that:
[e]mployers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable
accommodation for a handicapped employee. Although they are
not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an
employee alternative employment opportunities
reasonably
65
available under the employer's existing policies.
The court felt that the footnote was ambiguous and could mean
one of two things. 6 It could mean, as this court believed, "that an
employer is required by regulation to reasonably accommodate an
employee's handicap so as to enable him to perform the functions
of the position he currently holds."67 Alternatively, it could have
meant that "an employer may not forbid an employee who is
unqualified for the position he currently holds from availing himself
of other 'employment opportunities' (i.e., transfer or reassignment)
'
that are available under the employer's 'existing policies.' "68
In
either case, the court stated, "an employer is not required as a matter of reasonable accommodation to transfer or reassign an
employee who is not otherwise qualified for the position he then
holds.

69

Thus, since no form of reasonable accommodation would

have allowed the plaintiff to perform the essential functions of his
position because his clearance was denied, and the Navy was not
required to reassign. him to a non-sensitive position, the district
court's grant of summary judgment was affirmed.7 °
Under the ADA, both Carter and Guillot would probably have
been decided differently. It would have made no difference that, as
62. See id.
at 1326.
63. See id. at 1326-27.
64. See id. at 1326.
65. School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1987)(dictum)
(referring to note 17; 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 and Appendix A, pp. 315-316 (1985)). In Arline, a
schoolteacher afflicted with tuberculosis was held to be a handicapped individual under the
Rehabilitation Act. See id.at 289.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See Guillot, 970 F.2d at 1326-27.
Id. at 1326.
Id. at 1327.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 1327.
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in Carter,the employer's policy did not allow such transfers even if
the plaintiff was not disabled. 7 Both cases would have required the
employer to reassign the disabled worker to a vacant position,
rather than terminating the employee.
It is apparent from the changes made in the ADA, that Congress
did not want employers to eliminate the use of reassignment solely
because it was not explicitly required.

IV.

REASSIGNMENT UNDER

THE ADA

The change in standards of reasonable accommodation as
between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA was significant. The
ADA clearly has more specific language included directly in the
wording of the statute.7 2 To understand the change, one needs to
look at the plain language of the statute regarding "reasonable
accommodations," "essential functions," and "undue hardship," as
73
well as the policy behind including these provisions.
A.

Reasonable Accommodation
1. Statutory Language

The definition of "reasonable accommodation"'7 4 is the first of
the three pieces of the puzzle needed to qualify under the ADA for
reassignment to a vacant position. The ADA states that an
employer must make "reasonable accommodations to the known
physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
71. See Michael A. Faillace & Howard G. Ziff, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue
Hardship Under the ADA, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE wrriH THE AMERIcANs wrTH
DISABILTIES Acr A SATELLITE PROGRAM, at 63, 70 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 714, 1990).
72. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1994).
73. The focus of this Note is on the reassignment to a vacant position as a reasonable
accommodation, so the analysis of "essential functions" and "undue hardship" will be

cursory.
74. See generally Ben Cristal, Note, Going Beyond the Judicially PrescribedBoundaries
of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 13 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 493, 493-502 (1996) (discussing
the Supreme Court's attempt at separating reasonable accommodation from affirmative

action in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).
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entity."'75 The similarity to the wording of the DHHS is particularly
76
noteworthy.
In general, an accommodation is a modification to the work environment or particular workplace practices which enable a person
with a disability to do the job. The analysis of whether a reasonable
accommodation can be made is non-specific and must be conducted
on a case by case basis utilizing the human resource professional's
business judgment and available company and community
resources, often including input from the individual with a
disability.7 7

It would seem that the plain language of the ADA is designed to
require reasonable accommodations to allow disabled individuals to
be considered as qualified individuals under the statute, since the
accommodation will allow the disabled employee to perform the
essential functions of the job.78 The ADA even lists several suggestions for reasonable accommodations:
Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible
to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and,
job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications
of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and79other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities.
In addition, according to the legislative history, the reasoning
behind implementing the reasonable accommodation requirements
into the statute was to "provide a meaningful equal employment
opportunity... [that is] an opportunity to attain the same level of
performance as is available to non-disabled employees having similar skills and abilities." 80
75. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(b)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1994).
76. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1997).
77. See Susan M. Benton-Powers, The Americans With Disabilities Act: The Dity To
Reasonably Accommodate, in 26TH ANNUAL INsTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 305, 311
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-572,1997) (referring to Vande
Zande v. State of Wis. Dept. of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995)).
78. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1994).
80. S.RFP. No. 101-116, at 35 (1989); H.R. RnP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 66 (1989).
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2. Interpretive Guidance for Reasonable Accommodations
As the administrative agency that is given the power to enforce
the charges of employment bias in the ADA,8 ' the EEOC has
established a set of guidelines to assist in the interpretation of the
ADA.82 Relating to reassignment, the EEOC states: "An employer
may reassign an individual to a lower graded position if there are no
accommodations that would enable the employee to remain in the
current position and there are no vacant equivalent positions for
which the individual is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation."83 The EEOC even takes a further step in saying that if
there is a lower graded position for which the individual is qualified,
then the employer should reassign the disabled employee to that
position. 4
Although this is merely an interpretation by the EEOC, the
Supreme Court instructed that although the EEOC guidelines are
not controlling, they can be used for guidance as persuasive authority.85 Courts have relied upon this section of the EEOC to require
employers to reassign disabled employees to other types of vacant
positions, since those employees cannot remain in their current
position.86
Notably, courts have held that an employer does not have to provide a disabled employee with the best accommodation, or even the
one which the employee prefers, because the employer need only
make a reasonable accommodation. 87 The employer is also not
required to (1) lower qualifications of a job which are based on
good faith business judgment;8 8 (2) require another employee to
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(a) (1997).
See id. § 1630 & app.
Id. at app. § 1630.2(o).
See id.
See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vimson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General Elec. Co.

v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).

86. See Benson v, Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cm. 1995); Haysman
v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1104 (S.D.Ga. 1995); Vasquez v. Bedsole, 888 F. Supp.

727, 731 (E.D.N.C. 1995).
87. See generally Schmidt v. Methodist Hosp., 89 F.3d 342, 344 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a hearing-impaired nurse was not a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA,
and was properly discharged since he refused the reasonable accommodation offered by the

hospital).
88. See generally Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)
(holding that a college was not required to modify its nursing program where it would
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perform an essential function of the disabled employee's job;89 (3)
change an essential function of the job;90 or (4) bump a different
employee from a position or create a new position for the disabled
employee. 91
B. EssentialFunctions
1. Statutory Language
When the ADA prohibits discrimination and requires reasonable
accommodations to a disabled employee, that employee must be a
"qualified individual with a disability" g to be protected by the statute.93 This means that the employee must be an individual with a
disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such
individual holds or desires."94 However, the ADA does not specifically delineate guidelines to determine what the essential functions
of a job are, but it states that "consideration shall be given to the
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and
if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing an applicant for the job, this description shall be
considered evidence of the essential functions of the job." 95
2. Interpretive Guidance For Essential Functions
Once again the EEOC steps in to provide that "[t]he term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment
position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term
'essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the
dispense with the need for effective oral communication, in order to admit a licensed
practitional nurse who had a hearing disability).
89. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
90. See generally Durning v. Duffens Optical, Inc., No. 95-1093, WL 67640 (E.D. La.
1996) (holding that an employer was not required to change the essential functions of a job
for a salesman who suffered a stroke and could not perform the essential functions of his job
or any other reasonable accommodation).
91. See generally Riley v. Weyerhauser Paper Co., 898 F. Supp. 324 (W.D.N.C. 1995)
(holding that an employer did not have to change the essential functions of a job or reassign
an employee who was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis and could not operate or work
around machinery).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. V 1994).
93. See id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. V 1994).
95. Id.
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position."96 "The essential functions are those functions that the
individual who holds the position must be able to perform unaided
or with the assistance of a reasonable accommodation. ' 97 The
EEOC also suggests certain facts that an employer may consider in
determining if a particular function is essential or not:
(1) the employer's fair judgment;
(2) the written job description used before anyone was
interviewed;
(3) how much time the function takes during overall job
performance;
(4) what the consequences would be if the person did not have to
perform that particular function;
(5) any particular terms of a collective bargaining agreement;
(6) the experience of past workers of the same position; and
(7) the experience of current workers in the same or similar
positions.98
In general, the employer has been the one to determine what a
job is and what functions are needed to perform it,9 9 but the courts
have not remained completely out of the picture. For example, in
Hall v. United States Postal Service,100 the court noted that an
employer's determination of essential job functions "should be
based upon more than statements in a job description and should
reflect the actual functioning and circumstances of the particular
enterprise involved."''1 1
C. Undue Hardship
1. Statutory Language
The ADA defines an undue hardship as an "action requiring significant difficulty or expense." 2 This vague definition can leave
96. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1) (1997).
97. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(n) (1997).
98. See id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i-vii).
99. See Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 1995); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567
F. Supp. 369, 384 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Hutchison v. West, No. 03940051, 1995 WL 215407, at *4
(EEOC Mar. 31, 1995).
100. 857 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that there were genuine issues of material fact
as to whether a 70-pound lifting requirement was an essential function of a distribution clerk

position, and of whether or not a reasonable accommodation would have enabled her to
perform that function).
101. Id. at 1079.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A), (B) (Supp. V 1995).
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employers at a loss for determining when an accommodation is an
undue hardship. However, the ADA does provide the following
factors that employers should take into account:
(i) [T]he nature and cost of the accommodation needed...;
(ii) [T]he overall financial resources of the facility or facilities
involved in provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at the facility; the effect on such
expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) [T]he overall financial resources of the covered entity; the
overall size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities; and
(iv) [T]he type of operation or operations of the covered entity,
including the composition, structure, and function of the
workforce of such entity; the geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question
to the covered entity.10 3
2. Interpretive Guidance For Undue Hardship
In addition, the EEOC regulations add that an employer may
also consider "the impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and the impact on the facility's ability to conduct
business."'04 One such impact has included the assessment of
safety, and checks for loss of efficiency. 1 5 Legislative history also
suggests that if the undue hardship is a cost, the employer must pay
for a reasonable portion of that cost. 0 6 Also, an employer is
required to investigate and obtain any possible public funding that
is available for an accommodation. 0 7
Although these guidelines are provided to assist employers, it is
unclear if the courts will defer to the business judgment rule, 08 or
103. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v) (1997).

105. See Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1428 (D. Conn. 1987) (holding that an
employee who had achondroplastic dwarfism did not have to be reassigned since any
reasonable accommodation would reduce the efficiency of the business).
106. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 69 (1990).
107. See iUL
108. "It is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation act on an informed basis, in good faith and honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the corporation." Moore Corp. Ltd., Inc., v. Wallace Computer
Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1554 (D. Del. 1995).
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will be more stringent in this area, and perhaps disagree with the
employer's conclusion. 10 9 Another question is whether an employer
can set aside a certain amount for accommodations, and use that on
a first-come first-serve basis, thus possibly denying accommodations
later on. 1 0
D. Sample Cases of Reassignment Under the ADA
In a number of recent cases, the courts have used various reasons
to support their decisions of requiring employers to reasonably
accommodate a disabled employee, when that employee cannot
perform the essential functions of his or her current job. 1 '
In one of the recent cases, Gile v. United Airlines, Inc.,"2 the
plaintiff was diagnosed with a mental disorder, which her position
as a night shift data entry operator was aggravating, and she eventually could not perform her job." 3 Gile was placed on unpaid
authorized leave after she requested United to move her to any
position that did not require working the night shift." 4 Gile then
sued United under the ADA for failing to reasonably accommodate
her after she informed them of her disability." 5
On this issue, the court decided that the obligation for an
employer to reasonably accommodate a disabled employee, even
though that employee was not able to perform the essential functions of the job, could be inferred from the interpretive guidance of
109. See generally Ben Cristal, Note, Going Beyond the Judicially Described Boundaries

of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 13 HoFsrTRA

LAB.

L.J. 493, 507 (1996) (discussing

Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1993), where the court acknowledged the
problems the judiciary faces when it assesses undue hardship claims based on cost).

110. See Barbara Berish Brown, Reasonable Accommodation, Undue Hardship and
Employer Defenses Under the ADA, in EMP0LOYER COmPLiA CE wrr THE ANm~rcAs wrrH
DisABLrrms Acr A SATELLrr PROGRAM, at 91, 99 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Handbook
Series No. 714, 1990).

111. See generally Shiring v. Runyon, No. 95-3547,1996 WL 417636, at *4 (3d Cir. July 26,
1996) (stating that the change in the Rehabilitation Act which made it more similar to the
ADA included that an employer has to reassign a disabled employee even if they cannot
perform the essential functions of the job); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482,
485-87 (W.D. Ark. 1994) (stating that legislative history makes it apparent that Congress
wanted to have the ADA require employers to reassign disabled employees more often than
had been done under the Rehabilitation Act).
112. 95 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 1996).

113. See id. at 494.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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ADA regulations by the EEOC.1 1 6 The EEOC guidelines state that
"reassignment should be considered only when accommodation
within the individual's current position would pose an undue hardship."' 1 7 In addition, the court relied on the legislative history of

the ADA, s which states:
Reasonable accommodation may also include reassignment to a
vacant position. If an employee, because of disability can no
longer perform the essential functions of the job that she or he
has held, a transfer to another vacant job for which the person is
qualified may prevent the employee from being
out of work and
119
the employer from losing a valuable worker.
After considering the ADA, its regulations, the EEOC, as well as
a recognition of such similar decisions in other cases,120 the court
decided that, as long as an employee meets all of the other criteria
established in the ADA, because of the language of "reassignment
to a vacant position,'' z there may be an obligation for an employer
to reassign a disabled employee as an accommodation even where
that employee can no longer perform the essential functions of his
or her current job. 22 In this case, the court felt that United Airlines, Inc. should have considered reassign1g Gile to a shift outside
of her department, even though she could not perform the essential
functions of her current job on the night shift.'2
The results in most of these similar types of cases have worked in
favor of the disabled employee, where wrongful treatment by the
employer was found. However, it is possible for the laws of the
ADA to apply in favor of the employer. For instance, in Karbusicky
v. The City of Park Ridge, 24 the plaintiff was a police officer who
had lost the ability to hear from his left ear."z As a result of an
annual performance report, and from other officers' evaluations,
the police department permitted the plaintiff to use a hearing
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
v. Food
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

See id. at 497-98.
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
See Gile v. United Airlines Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996).
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt.2, at 63 (1990).
See Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995); Haysman
Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1104 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (Supp. V 1994).
See Gile, 95 F.3d at 498.
See id. at 499.
950 F.Supp. 878 (N.D. IlM.1997).
See id. at 879.
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device to improve his hearing.' 2 6 However, the plaintiff felt that the
hearing device was not helping, leading to the police department
offering to pay for a more expensive hearing aid, but the plaintiff
refused to try it. 27
A commission heard testimony from other police officers and
various doctors, and were going to discharge the plaintiff since "a
police officer's ability to hear is important for the officer's own
safety and for the safety of citizens and other police officers.'128
However, that decision was withheld when a Deputy Chief accommodated the plaintiff by assigning him to a position as a Community Service Officer. 1 29 In this position, the plaintiff maintained the
same salary that he had as a police officer with the proper increases,
as well as membership to the local union.3 °
Nevertheless, the plaintiff was not happy with this transfer, and
he filed a complaint alleging that the police department had violated the ADA.' 3 ' The court held that based on the evidence and
admissions by the plaintiff, he would have difficulty hearing in certain situations that are more than likely to occur as a police officer,
which could endanger himself as well as others. 3 2 Therefore, the
court felt that the plaintiff could not perform an essential function
of the job.33 In addition, the plaintiff could not offer any other reasonable accommodation that would allow him to remain in the position of a police officer, so the department's decision to transfer him
to the position of a Community Service Officer was a reasonable
accommodation.3
Although the court found that the plaintiff was not a qualified
individual under the ADA, 35 it based its decision on Gile and on
the EEOC's interpretive guidance. 3 6
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id. at 880.
See id.
Id. at 881.
See id.at 882.
See Karbusicky, 950 F. Supp. at 882.
See id.
See id. at 884.
See id.
See id. at 884-85.
See id. at 884.
See Karbisocky, 950 F. Supp. at 883-84.
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V. Tim PROBLEMS THAT REMAIN FOR EMPLOYERS
Reasonable accommodation in the ADA is a bold attempt at
reducing discrimination against disabled employees in the
workforce, and its application seems straightforward. 137 However,
the only aspect that seems clear, is that
[e]mployers should grant the request for a reassignment to a
vacant position only after they have determined that the request
is based on the disability and not on the employee's inability (for
reasons totally unrelated to the disability) to perform the essenpresently holds with or without reatial functions of the job s/he
138
sonable accommodation.
As the Gile court pointed out, the ADA and its regulations only
provide for reassignment to a vacant position, but does not describe
under what circumstances this should be done. 139 For instance, can

the vacant position be substantially similar, can it be in a different
in the
office or department, or can it be a different type of position
140
same office, a different office or a different department?
The only other official guideline to help employers is laid out by
the EEOC, in saying that employers should try to reassign disabled
employees to equivalent positions for which the employee is qualified for, with or without reasonable accommodations. 4 ' If that is
not possible, then the employer may reassign the disabled employee
to a lower graded position.' 42
137. See Barbara Berish Brown, Reasonable Accomodation, Hardship and Employer
Defenses Under the ADA, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE wrrH THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILrTIES Acr: A SATELLrIE PROGRAM, at 91, 95-97 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Handbook

Series No. 714, 1990). There is a four step process for providing a reasonable accommodation
under the ADA. See id. Step one is to identify the barriers to performance, step two is to
identify possible accommodations, step three is to assess the reasonableness of each possible
accommodation, and step four is to choose from among the reasonable accommodations. See
id.
138. Michael Faillace, Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act: Statutory
Requirements, Legislative History, Regulations, Technical Assistance Manual, Relevant Case
Law Under the ADA, and 1973 RehabilitationAct, and PracticalRecommendations, in 24TH
ANNUAL INsTrTuTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 481, 552 (PLI Lit. & Admin. Practice Series
Lit. Course Handbook Series No. H-527, 1995).
139. See Gile, 95 F.3d at 497.
140. See id.
141. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
142. See id.; Pattison v. Meijer, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1002 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that

the employer can reassign the employee to a lower paid position that he or she is qualified

for).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol15/iss2/8

18

19981

The Development
of Reassignment
to a Vacant Position
Berenholz:
The Development
of Reassignment
to a Vacant Position in the Ameri

In addittion, there is much confusion and disagreement about the
types of positions an employee is allowed to be reassigned to, and
the methods that an employer may use to reassign an employee.143
For instance, one court has held that:
[w]hile reasonable accommodation may include reassignment to
a vacant position, the ADA does not impose on an employer the
affirmative duty to find another job for an employee who is no
longer qualified for the job he or she was doing. Rather, the
ADA prohibits employers from denying an employee alternative
employment opportunities 144reasonably available under the
employer's existing policies.
However, "[t]he EEOC has not indicated if an employer may
apply its existing reassignment policies and procedures when
accommodating a disabled individual by reassigning him or her to a
vacant position."'1 45 If employers do not know how the courts in
their jurisdiction will rule as to what degree they are responsible for
reassigning a disabled employee, and the EEOC provides no guidance, employers might not know how to prepare beforehand to
avoid liability. For example, will an employer be required to pay for
relocation costs when it reassigns a disabled employee as an accom46
modation, even if that is not the employer's standard procedure?1
It may also be logical to assume that an employer would want the
best employee possible for each position. If an employer must reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position as an accommodation,
must that employer do so even though that employee is less qualified than other individuals who are also interested in the same
position?' 41 7

143. See generally Beth Aspedon & John A. Ricca, Americans With DisabilitiesAct: An
Analysis of Developments Relating to Disability Discrimination Law, in 26TH ANNuAL
INSTrrIE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW, at 177,284-292 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Series, Litig.
Course Handbook Series No. H-572, 1997) (stating that the courts are somewhat unclear on
what efforts are required of an employer to vacate such a position); John D. Thompson,
Psychiatric Disorders, Workplace Violence and the Americans With Disabilities Act, 19
HAMLnE L. Rnv. 25, 54 (1995).
144. Aspedon & Ricca, supra note 143, at 288 (analyzing Marschand v. Norfolk and
Western R.R., 4 AD Cases 1099 (N.D. Ind. 1995), affd, 81 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 1996)).
145. Thompson, supra note 143, at 54.
146. See Thompson, supra note 143, at 54.
147. See Thompson, supra note 143, at 54.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1998

19

Hofstra
Labor
Employment Law
Law Journal
Hofstra
Labor
and&Employment
Journal, Vol. 15,[Vol.
Iss. 15,635
2 [1998], Art. 8

There is also much confusion over the term "vacancy.' 1 48 Is a
position considered vacant if an employee leaves that position, but
the employer had intended to eliminate it? 149 How long must an
employer keep a disabled employee in a position in which he or she
cannot perform, while waiting for a possible position to become
vacant?' 50 Does an employer have to keep vacant positions open
for a specified time to allow for the possibility of having to reassign
a disabled employee? 15 ' Finally, is there any requirement for
employers to post a list of vacant positions so that disabled employees will know? 152 These, and other questions of interpretation in
regards to the essential functions and undue hardship, only compound the uncertainty which employers face with reassignment to a
vacant position. ,
Vi.

CoNcLUSION

All of the changes between the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
signify the intent by the legislature, and as an extension of society in
general, to make sure that the members of the disabled population
are truly equally integrated into the American social and economic
mainstream.1 53 To further bolster this conclusion, in 1992, Congress
implemented the reasonable accommodation of reassignment to a
vacant position provision into the Rehabilitation Act, by accepting
the same standards as applied under Title I of the ADA. 54 So a suit
brought under either statute will prevent an employer from not
including reassignment to a vacant position as an option for reasonably accommodating a qualified disabled individual. However, reassignment is only available to disabled employees, and not
applicants. 55
148. See Michael A. Faillace & Howard G. Ziff, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue

Hardship Under the ADA, in EMPLOYER COMPLIANCE WrrH THE AMERICANS WITH
DisAiLrris Acrt A SArELL=TE PRoGRAM, at 63, 69-71 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 714, 1990).
149. See id.
at 71.
150. See Thompson, supra note 143, at 54.
151. See Faillace & Ziff, supra note 148, at 71.
152. See Faillace & Ziff, supra note 148, at 71.
153. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. V 1994).
154. Act of Oct. 29, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-569, Title V § 506, 106 Stat. 4360, 4428
(amending the Rehabilitation Act).
155. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1997).
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The only defense which employers can claim is that of undue
hardship.'- 6 Although that is not the specific focus of this Note, it is
important to take a brief look at the compliance costs and possible
hardships which reassignment to a vacant position might cause. The
EEOC estimates that the cost of an average reasonable accommodation would come out to $261.'57 At this cost, it would seem that
reasonable accommodations would not be an undue hardship for
some employers. 15 However, the economic impact should be
regarded on a grand scale. "[T]he required scope of an employer's
search for alternative positions
may be quite substantial depending
159
on its size and resources.1
The laws, by design, will allow more disabled individuals to enter
into the workforce, who might require accommodations. 60 The
employer will have to find an accommodation for an injured
employee, rather than declare him or her to be unfit for work.' 6 '
While some accommodations have a fixed cost, like the fees of an
interpreter or a hearing aid, others are intangible.162 These intangible costs, especially the cost of time lost to reassigning and training
a disabled employee for a vacant position, are difficult to calculate,
but still "must also be borne by the employer.' 63 Bearing even
more on this point, "[a]n employer fails to satisfy its obligation to

156. See id. § 1630.9(a).
157. See Edward J. McGraw, Compliance Costs of the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 18
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 521, 535 (1993) (quoting Meg Fletcher & Sara J. Harty, Law to Help
Disabled May Injure Employers, Bus. INs., Jan. 27, 1992, at 85 (revealing that "[ain EEOC
study estimates that the total cost of all changes to satisfy the reasonable accommodation
provision will be $261 per accommodation on average")).
158. See id.
159. Matthew B. Schiff & David L. Miller, The Americans With DisabilitiesAct" A New
Challenge For Employers, 27 ToRT & INs. L.J. 44, 57 & n.128 (1991) (referring to Rhone v.
U.S. Dep't of the Army, 665 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.Mo. 1987) (commenting that in "in large
agencies with large budgets ... the agency will be required to expend fairly substantial
amounts of time and money to keep handicapped employees on the payroll." Rhone, 665 F.
Supp. at 745 n.19)).
160. See Schiff & Miller, supra note 159, at 63.
161. See Schiff & Miller, supra note 159, at 63.
162. McGraw, supra note 157, at 535.
163. McGraw, supra note 157, at 535 (relying on 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1988 & Supp. II
1988) (stating that the nature of the accommodation coincides with the employment
positions' functions)).
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provide reasonable accommodation if the disabled employee 164
is
assigned to a position in which he is not capable of performing."
When preparing for the requirement of reassignment to a vacant
position, employers can foresee that they must readjust their job
descriptions and qualifications "to ensure that they are job related
and consistent with business necessity.' 65
The questions that remain regarding reassignment to a vacant
position will lead to more problems with Worker's Compensation
laws, 66 and, of course, litigation. 67 Clearly, though, litigation and
other costs are secondary to the overarching desire for equality in
the workplace.
Jeffrey S. Berenholz

164. Schiff & Miller, supra note 159, at 57 (relying on Rhone, 665 F. Supp. 734; Carter v.
Bennett, 840 F.2d 63 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (inquiring whether or not disabled employees were
assigned to positions they could perform)).
165. Schiff & Miller, supra note 159, at 64.
166. See generally McGraw, supra note 157, at 537-39 (exploring the ADA's potential to
raise employer costs of obtaining workers' compensation insurance).
167. See generally McGraw, supra note 157, at 539-41 (describing the ADA's potential to
increase employer litigation costs).
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